IISS Report: Russia's UAV Campaign Over Europe Exposes NATO Air Defence Gaps
A recent report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies concludes that it is highly likely Russia conducted a sustained UAV campaign across Europe, penetrating the airspace of some of the continent's most sensitive military installations, including nuclear-sharing sites and France's ballistic missile submarine base, while operating with effective impunity for over 15 months. The report documents 144 incidents between August 2024 and February 2026 across 13 European countries, with sightings in Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK, and Denmark.
It assesses that Russian-linked commercial vessels, such as shadow-fleet tankers, coastal freighters, and smaller craft, likely served as mobile launch platforms for UAVs operating near European ports, airports, energy infrastructure, and military facilities. These vessels typically switched off AIS transponders during launch or recovery before resuming normal transmission. Confirmed maritime launch cases include a February 2026 incident in which the Swedish military assessed a drone jammed near the French carrier Charles de Gaulle as Russian in origin and launched from the spy ship Zhigulevsk, and a December 2024 episode in which the shadow vessel Vezhen circled off the Irish coast during Volodymyr Zelensky's visit while military drones flew above an Irish navy ship nearby. Sightings peaked in late 2025, resulting in temporary closures at airports including Brussels, Copenhagen, Munich, Oslo, and Vilnius. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen described the incidents in Denmark as the most serious attack on Danish infrastructure to date.
The report characterises the campaign as a deliberate exploitation of the gap between Europe's conventional air-defense systems and the low-cost, deniable nature of UAV incursions. The campaign is designed to test alliance response times, reveal radar and detection vulnerabilities, and normalise repeated airspace violations without crossing the threshold for a collective NATO response. The absence of formal attribution to Russia by any European government, despite private acknowledgment of Moscow's responsibility, highlights a key issue: nations have addressed each incursion as an isolated incident rather than recognising a continent-wide pattern. This approach has allowed the 18-month campaign to continue largely unchallenged. Efforts to address the vulnerability, such as the EU's planned European Drone Defence Initiative, are hindered by fragmented legal authority and slow attribution processes. Even with a fully operational system, UAVs would only be intercepted after entering European airspace, leaving the shadow-fleet vessels that launch them unaffected.
As long as these vessels can operate with impunity in international waters or European exclusive economic zones, the report concludes, the campaign's enabling mechanism will persist, representing a strategic vulnerability that exceeds current political will to address it.