Six Metres from Disaster: What Russia’s Black Sea Intercepts Mean for NATO

Photo by Anna Zvereva from Tallinn, Estonia - Russian Air Force, RF-81719, Sukhoi Su-35S, CC BY-SA 2.0,

By Archie Millett

In April 2026, two Russian fighter jets intercepted an unarmed RAF Rivet Joint surveillance aircraft over the Black Sea while it was operating in international airspace. According to the MOD, a Russian Su-35 flew close enough to trigger the aircraft’s emergency systems and disable its autopilot. A Su-27 then made six passes in front of the RAF aircraft, coming within six metres of its nose.

The MoD described it as the most dangerous Russian action against a British Rivet Joint aircraft since a plane fired a missile over the Black Sea in 2022. On that occasion, Russia initially blamed a “technical malfunction”, but later reports stated the pilot fired after receiving an ambiguous ground command, and that the first missile missed rather than malfunctioned.

These events should not be seen as isolated incidents. They sit within a wider pattern of Russian pressure against UK military aviation, and a broader shift in how hostile states test Western resilience below the threshold of open conflict.

In March 2024, an RAF aircraft carrying then Defence Secretary Grant Shapps, officials and journalists experienced GPS jamming while flying near Kaliningrad on a route from Poland to the UK. The interference reportedly lasted around 30 minutes. During that period, mobile phones could not connect to the internet and the aircraft relied on alternative methods to confirm its position.

The UK government said the incident did not threaten the safety of the aircraft. Yet the event showed that UK aircraft operating near Russian military zones can be exposed to electronic disruption, and that crews may need to fall back on backup navigation when satellite signals are degraded or denied.

Kaliningrad matters because it is a heavily militarised Russian exclave between Poland and Lithuania, giving Moscow a forward position on NATO’s eastern flank. Its role as home to Russia’s Baltic Fleet means electronic interference in the area is more than an aviation nuisance. It is one of the ways Russia can apply pressure against aircraft operating near NATO territory.

For the UK, the issue is not only whether Russia intends to shoot down or damage an aircraft. The more immediate challenge is persistent disruption: jamming, spoofing, close intercepts, unsafe manoeuvres and attempts to impose risk on routine operations.

This is hybrid warfare in its most practical form. Aviation relies on signals as much as steel: GPS, timing, communications and navigation systems. When those signals are jammed or spoofed, flights may continue, but with less certainty, more workload and a narrower margin for error.

That is why aviation resilience now has to include electromagnetic resilience. Russia is not only testing UK and NATO aircraft in the air; it is testing the systems on which those aircraft depend. The challenge is not just controlling airspace. It is being able to operate when the signal disappears.

The UK’s response cannot only be deterrence.

It has to be resilience.

May 2026